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ABSTRACT
Manuscript Type: Empirical
Research Question/Issue: To address the lack of a complementarities-based approach in studies of board diversity, this paper
seeks to understandwhether and how certain country-level factors are causally and jointly related towomen on boards and the
nature of their complementarities (are they synergic or substitutes?). Moreover, we intend to learn more about the
adoption/diffusion of board gender quotas, by taking into account their role in the existing national configurations (whether
they are necessary and/or sufficient conditions).
Research Findings/Insights: Using fs/QCA, our findings reveal a particular configuration of country-level conditions that sup-
ports the existence of a joint causal relation between given institutional arrangements. Furthermore, we find that board gender
quota legislation is not a sufficient condition on its own to achieve a higher number of women on boards. Such evidence sug-
gests that its diffusion across countries could be the result of institutional isomorphism or social legitimacymore than to rational
reasons.
Theoretical/Academic Implications: For scholars, our paper refines and expands insights from the extant comparative corpo-
rate governance literature. By finding support for the “bundled” or jointly causal nature of given institutional factors, we open a
window for further research that investigates board-level phenomena in a complementarities-based perspective.
Practitioner/Policy Implications: For policymakers, this study provides some insights that could better drive their choice about
which mix of policies is necessary to improve female representation on boards, and especially in which institutional areas they
should be implemented. It is particularly relevant, because once gender quotas are endorsed at board level, they could have am-
biguous effects on firm performance and corporate governance.
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Configurational Approach, Qualitative Comparative Analysis, Women on Boards
INTRODUCTION
There is a vigorous tradition in economic researchunderlining the influence of institutional environments
on a wide range of corporate governance phenomena. Nota-
ble examples concern studies of business behaviors and per-
formances (e.g., Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013; Zattoni,
Pedersen, & Kumar, 2009), corporate governance legitimacy
(e.g., Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Judge, Douglas, & Kutan,
2008), and corporate governance practices (e.g., Aguilera &
Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; Denis & McConnell, 2003), such as
the adoption/diffusion of international accounting standards
or codes of good governance (Alon, 2013; Judge, Li, & Pinsker,
2010; Zattoni & Cuomo, 2008). Furthermore, a comparative
and country-level literature has explored the effects of institu-
tional antecedents on the composition of corporate boards of
directors, with particular regard to gender diversity issues
(Adams & Kirchmaier, 2013; De Anca, 2008; Grosvold, 2011;
Grosvold & Brammer, 2011; Terjesen & Singh, 2008). In detail,
legal, cultural, and occupational environments have been
found to play the most relevant role for the prevalence of
women on boards (Adams & Kirchmaier, 2013; Grosvold &
Brammer, 2011) and, interestingly, a close interdependence be-
tween them has appeared in a parallel stream of research (e.g.,
Esping-Andersen, 1990; Mandel & Semyonov, 2006; Misra &
Moller, 2005; Orloff, 1993, 1996). Alongside, institutional argu-
ments have spread in the literature about the adoption of gen-
der quota legislation for boards of directors. For instance,
Terjesen, Aguilera, and Lorenz (2014) propose that it is highly
coherent with the presence of certain institutional factors,
while Grosvold and Brammer (2011) support its compensa-
tory role which likely makes up for the deficiencies of others
institutions.
This state of the art suggests that gender diversity on corpo-
rate boards may be the outcome of multiple complementary
institutional domains, as regulatory policies, welfare states, la-
bor, and cultural institutions are not just independent from
each other but they appear to be closely interrelated. How-
ever, this literature presents two main limitations. First, prior
empirical evidence suggests that a relationship between these
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institutional domains exists, but a lack of holistic perspective
has limited our knowledge of whether, how, and which
country-level factors in each institutional domain are in
conjunctural causality with the representation of women on
boards. The second limitation is that the arguments about gen-
der quotas have been relatively separate from studies of insti-
tutional antecedents for women on boards, with little
attention to the importance of existing national configurations
for the introduction of new regulatory policies. As a result,
what remains rather unclear is whether gender quotas for cor-
porate boards are sufficient by themselves to achieve a higher
number of women on boards (Adams & Kirchmaier, 2013;
Bergstø, 2013), or if they are substitutes or complements in
current national configurations.
This study adopts a configurational approach in exploring
the joint influence of particular institutional arrangements on
diversity on boards and the nature of their complementarities.
More exhaustively, we draw on institutional complementar-
ities theory to argue that female representation on boards is
the outcome of a conjunctural causal relationship between cer-
tain institutional conditions. Furthermore, we investigate the
role of board gender quotas in the existing national configura-
tions in terms of their sufficiency and necessity for gender bal-
ance on boards. In a comparative perspective, the analysis
examines the 27 European Union countries and takes each
country as a configuration of specific conditions in four insti-
tutional domains: regulatory policies, welfare states, labor,
and cultural institutions. In order to explore causal relations
and combinatory effects, we employ fuzzy set/Qualitative
Comparative Analysis (fs/QCA), a set-theoretic method par-
ticularly suitable for studying countries in terms of their mul-
tiple memberships in sets of institutional attributes. Our
findings reveal a particular configuration of country-level con-
ditions, where the effect of a single condition unfolds only in
combination with other conditions, supporting the existence
of complementarities and joint causal relationships. In addi-
tion, they show that board gender quota legislation is neither
a sufficient nor a necessary condition to achieve a higher num-
ber of women on boards. Such evidence suggests that their
diffusion across countries could be due to institutional isomor-
phism more than to efficiency or rational reasons.
Overall, this study makes two important contributions.
First, after identifying the key institutional domains to be in-
vestigated, we provide a systematic theoretical reasoning
about the influence of their complementarities in shaping gen-
der balance on corporate board of directors. Second, the use of
a configurational approach provides an important methodo-
logical contribution. Through fs/QCA, we empirically ex-
plore our theory-derived propositions and capture the
complex relationships between country-level causal condi-
tions and the representation of women on boards. As a result,
our paper refines and expands insights from the extant com-
parative corporate governance literature, by opening a win-
dow for further complementary-based research concerning
board composition and demography. For policy makers, it
provides some insights that can better drive their choice about
which mix of policies might be necessary to improve female
representation on boards, and especially inwhich institutional
domains they should be implemented.
The paper is structured as follows. After the literature re-
view, we discuss the theoretical framework and develop our
propositions. The following sections describe the research
methodology and the main findings resulting from the com-
parative analysis. Discussion and conclusions are provided
in the last section.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Institutions and Institutional Complementarities
Institutional theory points out that institutions influence
economic activities, organizational structure, and human be-
havior. Institutions represent the formal (e.g., laws, constitu-
tions) and informal constraints (e.g., taboos, traditions, socio-
cultural norms) which limit individuals and organizational
choices (North, 1990). In other words, they shape the interac-
tions of human beings and form expectations of what people
will do (Nugent & Lin, 1995). (Scott, 1987: 499) defines institu-
tions as relatively resilient “systems of social beliefs and so-
cially organized practices associated with varying functional
arenas within social systems,” such as work, politics, laws,
or regulations. In this vein, any institution “fits into a system
of institutions” (Neale, 1988: 245) in a way that they co-exist
and co-evolve within a given structure by showing mutually
reinforcing characteristics (Ahlering & Deakin, 2007; Deeg,
2007; Jackson & Deeg, 2008). Extant research refers to this in-
terdependence with the concept of institutional complemen-
tarities. Such a perspective is widespread in the comparative
capitalism literature, because institutional complementarities
are acknowledged as an important mechanism to explain the
diversity of national institutional systems and their resistance
to change (e.g., Amable, 2003; Aoki, 2001; North, 1991). For in-
stance, Amable (2000) argues that the overall coherence of a
“national model” can be better understood by considering a
large set of interacting and interrelated institutional arrange-
ments, rather than isolated institutions. Indeed, when comple-
mentarities occur, the existence of an institutional form
reinforces the existence of the others: this generates a
“dynamic stability” (Amable, 2003).
Generally, complementarity between some elements stems
from the circumstance that employing one of them increases
the value of employing the others (Aoki, 2001; Milgrom &
Roberts, 1995). From the institutional perspective, comple-
mentarities imply that the conjunction of two or more insti-
tutions together enhances the performance of a given actor
(e.g., organizations or national economies). However, two
main logics are embodied in institutional complementarity.
When two or more institutions are organized around similar
properties and common principles, the logic is similarity.
Conversely, the logic of contrast occurs when institutions
with different or contrasting properties coexist and one
makes up for the deficiencies of the other (Crouch, 2005).
While the latter logic implies a sort of compensation, the for-
mer refers to the presence of synergies between institutions.
Since similar structures make coexistent institutions mutu-
ally reinforced (Campbell, 2011), the more aligned and con-
sistent the institutions, the better a given country-level
outcome (Amable, 2003).
Although the complementarities-based approach has
spread in financial (e.g., Amable, Ernst, & Palombarini, 2005;
Campbell, 2011) and corporate governance research (e.g.,
Aguilera, Filatotchev, Gospel, & Jackson, 2008; Garcìa-Castro,
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Aguilera, & Ariño, 2013; Höpner, 2005; Jackson, 2005; Kang &
Moon, 2012; Rediker & Seth, 1995; Weimer & Pape, 1999), it
has been neglected in previous studies of diversity on corpo-
rate boards. It is in this gap that we place our research.
Institutional Arguments on Gender Diversity on
Boards
The comparative and country-level research on corporate
boards has addressed the role of national institutional charac-
teristics in shaping gender diversity on boards of directors, es-
pecially with regard to institutional systems (Grosvold, 2011;
Grosvold & Brammer, 2011; Terjesen & Singh, 2008), infra-
structures and public policies (Terjesen, Sealy, & Singh,
2009), and occupational environments (Adams & Kirchmaier,
2013).
Grosvold and Brammer (2011) show that countries with
generous welfare provisions encouraging women to balance
work and family (French and Germanic legal heritages), have
fewer women board directors. From a cultural perspective,
the authors find that Nordic European and Eastern European
culture-oriented countries have a significantly greater percent-
age ofwomen on boards, owing to their lower levels of gender
differentiation. Looking at labor institutions, Adams and
Kirchmaier (2013) argue that the presence of (non-executive)
women on boards is positively related to female employment,
by excluding part-time and unemployed workers. For this
reason, the authors underline the importance of policies pro-
moting full-time and family services, since part-time jobs for
taking on family responsibilities could undermine women’s
professional careers. The rationale of focusing on careers to
search for the main causes of the under-representation of
women on boards is that full participation in the labor market
allowswomen to acquire those competences, experiences, and
social capital to sit on boards (e.g., Adams & Flynn, 2005;
Doldor, Vinnicombe, Gaughan, & Sealy, 2012; Singh &
Vinnicombe, 2004; Terjesen et al., 2009).
Interestingly, a parallel body of literature reveals that female
employment and careers are primarily affected by two ele-
ments: welfare institutions and cultural/prescriptive norms
about gender roles in society. In detail, much research docu-
ments that welfare states can fail to release women from
family responsibilities and increase unequal gender represen-
tation between and within classes or exclude women from in-
fluential occupations (e.g., Esping-Andersen, 1990; Mandel &
Semyonov, 2006; Mandel & Shalev, 2009; Misra & Moller,
2005). In a similar vein, a number of scholars argue that gen-
der stereotypes and gender schemas in social culture are
strong impediments for both female career advancement
and representation on boards (e.g., Adams & Kirchmaier,
2013; Nelson & Levesque, 2007; Terjesen et al., 2009, 2014;Wil-
liams, 2000). In turn, welfare states themselves are found to
play a key role in promoting equal opportunities (e.g.,
Esping-Andersen, 1990, 1999; Grosvold & Brammer, 2011;
Mandel& Semyonov, 2006;Misra&Moller, 2005). They signif-
icantly impact on gender relations, aswell as on the gender di-
vision of caring and domestic labor (Orloff, 1993, 1996). These
interdependencies are generally supported also by sociolo-
gists, who point out that the greatest share of variance in the
individual life courses is due to: (1) external social structures
linked to the division of labor; (2) the division of labor within
households; and (3) the intervention of the state through wel-
fare provisions (Mayer, 2009).
Although not exhaustively, institutional arguments have in-
formed a number of studies about the adoption and diffusion
of gender quotas for corporate boards. In Teigen’s work
(Teigen, 2012), the spread of gender quota legislation is ex-
plained according to mechanisms of diffusion, path depen-
dency, and critical conjunctures of distinctive national
conditions. Terjesen et al. (2014) argue that the establishment
of gender quotas for corporate boards arises from a particular
institutional environment, consisting in: (1) gendered welfare
state provisions; (2) left-leaning political government; and (3)
path-dependent policy initiatives for gender equality. These
circumstances of institutional coherence between some
country-level factors do not necessarily imply complementar-
ities (Deeg, 2007), albeit complementarities could exist. Con-
versely, Grosvold and Brammer (2011) discuss that more
radical affirmative action should be taken when national cul-
tural heritages are slow to change. In this way, gender legisla-
tion on boards might be a supplementary institution, likely
making up for the deficiencies of other institutions (according
to Crouch, 2005).
Despite their contributions in the institutional understand-
ing of gender diversity on boards, these studies have failed
to investigate the effects of the joint influence of institutions
on women on boards. In this way, the causal mechanism un-
derlying their relationships has remained less than clear.
Moreover, a deeper analysis of the role of gender regulatory
policies in the existing national configurations is still needed.
There is therefore scope to explore their necessity or suffi-
ciency, as well as their complementary or supplementary
function in national institutional systems.
Given their close interconnection and their importance as
antecedents of women on boards, welfare, labor, and cultural
institutions are particularly suitable to be investigated in
terms of complementarities. Accordingly, we need to focus
on how gender roles in these three institutional domains are
causally and jointly related to gender balance on boards. In
line with Schneider and Wagemann (2012), this means that
women on boards could be re-framed as the outcome
resulting from sets of institutional attributes. For the purpose
of this study, in the next section we theoretically argue for
the existence of complementarities between welfare, labor,
and cultural institutions. Therefore, in order to explore
conjunctural causality, we empirically explore our proposi-
tions by taking countries as configurations of certain
country-level causal conditions, including gender quotas on
corporate boards.
THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT
The subject of women on corporate boards clearly has social
origins, since it evokes a problem of equality in the distribu-
tion of opportunity and power in a given social system. As a
result, the presence of women in top corporate positions can
be conceived as a subset of the overall power structure. If
the problem of female under-representation on boards is con-
ceptualized as embedded within broader gender-related so-
cial phenomena, women on boards cannot be separated
from issues related to women in family, workforce,
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polity/state, and culture. The rationale is that gender itself is
an institution intertwined with other institutions (Martin,
2004), as some gendered practices and processes have moved
gender in multiple settings and contexts (Acker, 1992). In this
frame, “gender is a property of collectivities, institutions and
historical processes” (Connell, 1987: 139), and it can be consid-
ered “an institution embedded in the workplace, occupations,
and occupational environments through formally defined
rules, roles, and responsibilities and the ‘habitus’ of mental
structures through which individuals think about their social
world” (Terjesen et al., 2009: 324). Accordingly, complemen-
tarities between welfare, labor, and cultural institutions can
be established on the logic of similarity, because of their simi-
lar approaches with regard to the gender perspective. We dis-
cuss each in turn.
Among the others, welfare institutions show a profound
“gendered” nature. In general, states have had power over
other institutions, because they have “codified many aspects
of gender into laws or regulations” (Martin, 2004:1259). Insti-
tutions reflect the interests of those who have power to make
rules and they are not necessarily socially efficient (North,
1990). Thus, men’s power over women has been supported
by legal institutions for many years (Connell, 1987). Consis-
tent with these arguments, we find that motherhood legisla-
tion was enacted so many years earlier than laws for
fatherhood rights (Table A1), and it has been particularly resil-
ient to change. The extended length of maternity leave is a
common feature in EU countries and it disguises an unbal-
anced protection of motherhood rather than fatherhood or
parenthood. This is clear evidence that states have mobilized
gender into welfare institutions. In this way, they have for-
mally institutionalized the prevalent role of women in
childcare and housework, by contributing to define gender
roles in family and work institutions, as well as in the overall
society.
In this vein, a similar gendered logic is embedded in labor
institutions. According toWilliams (2005), much of gender in-
equality in occupational environments depends on the fact
that the prescriptive norm of the ideal worker (e.g., full-time
and full-force for working) comes into conflict with the preva-
lent role of women in family responsibilities (e.g., full-time
and full-force for childbearing and childrearing) in a way that
makes them not “un-gendered” norms. For instance, the typ-
ical skill regimes of coordinated market economies (CMEs)
are found to be more appropriate to the male model of full-
time and continuous employment, by limiting women to cer-
tain areas of employment (Mandel & Shalev, 2009). In view of
that, welfare and labor institutions are closely complementary
in their “gendered” structures: the presence of more gender
unbalanced welfare polices enhances the presence of gender
imbalance in labor markets, as well as in prescriptive norms
of what is expected by women and men.
Finally, it is widely acknowledged that national cultures
have an important role in shaping gender roles in society. Cul-
ture stems from human behaviors, recursive practices, norms,
and beliefs of a given society. Considering the fundamental so-
ciality of gender (Lorber, 1994), it is rational to assume that,
when social actors take “gendered” behaviors, processes and
practices, gender itself ends up flowing into national culture.
Moreover, since individuals with common cultural back-
grounds share convergent mental models, ideologies, and
institutions, it is reasonable that those institutions underlie
common beliefs and cultural norms on what is expected from
individuals (Denzau & North, 1994). Therefore, if gender is a
property embedded in cultural institutions, we can argue that
the presence of gender in national cultures enhances the pres-
ence of gender in other institutions. The idea is that gender
schemas in national cultures may lead to more gendered wel-
fare and labor institutions. In turn, gendered welfare institu-
tions may contribute to intensify the presence of gender
imbalance in labor markets, with consequent fewer employ-
ment and career opportunities for women.
Taken together, welfare, cultural, and labor institutions
complement each other and reciprocally strengthen their gen-
dered nature. The presence of institutional complementarities
causes mutual reinforcement and synergistic effects on the
distribution of power and opportunity in a given institutional
system. According to our rationale, complementarities be-
tween these three institutional domains contribute to explain
the different performance in terms of female representation
on boards between EU countries. Indeed, if women on boards
reflect the overall power structure of social systems, we ex-
pect that in countries where welfare, labor, and cultural insti-
tutions are aligned and highly consistent with an “un-
gendered” perspective, performance in terms of women on
boards will be higher, because of the synergistic effect of
complementarities.
Therefore, we suggest the following:
Proposition 1a. The more “un-gendered” cultural, welfare, and
labor institutions, the greater the number of women on boards
of directors.
Clearly, assuming the existence of institutional complemen-
tarities posits that the effects of one institution are contingent
on the presence/absence of another (Jackson, 2005). In this
vein, complementarities underlie a causal effect and they per-
mit the exploration of possible claims to causality (Deeg, 2007;
Kogut & Ragin, 2006). Investigating causal relations consists
in unraveling the necessary and sufficient conditions and
combinations of these two types of causes for a given outcome
(Schneider & Wagemann, 2012: 53). When we propose that
complementary and aligned institutions have mutually rein-
forcing effects on female representation on boards, we are as-
suming an underlying conjunctural causality. This joint
causation can be intended in terms of conjunction or combina-
tion of multiple conditions where no single cause may be ei-
ther necessary or sufficient (Kogut & Ragin, 2006:47; Ragin,
2000). Set-theoretic methods are particularly suitable for
exploring these issues and their logic has been applied to em-
pirically explore our propositions.
Conjunctural causal relationship is establishedwhen a com-
bination of causal conditions are linked by logical AND oper-
ators (*). For example, A*B*C implies that a single condition A
plays a causal role only in combination with other causal fac-
tors (B and C). In order to empirically verify the existence of
institutional complementarities, the main causal conditions
at national level have been selected according to: (1) their sig-
nificant impact on gender diversity on corporate boards; (2)
their capacity to generate complementarities with other insti-
tutional domains (Deeg, 2007); and (3) their importance in
supporting the gendered nature of institutions. Therefore, for
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each institutional domain we suggest the following causal
conditions.
Welfare institutions operate at multiple levels, through sev-
eral public policies and with different outcomes for the
wellbeing of a number of social groups. Consistent with our
arguments, we look into the structure of parental leave poli-
cies (i.e., paternity, maternity, and parental leave) and the pro-
vision of childcare services for assessing the presence of
gender in welfare institutions. We are motivated by two as-
pects. Firstly, if we include parental leave policies for mother,
father, and both parents, we can have an important foregoer
of the gender division of family and childcare responsibilities.
Secondly, the nature of the welfare state is closely related to
gendered dimensions of maternity leave, childcare services,
and female labor participation (Terjesen et al., 2014). Mother’s
entitlements and maternity leave were often chosen as exam-
ples of the perverse effects of work/family reconciliation pol-
icies on female employment and careers (e.g., Aschcraft, 1999;
Grosvold & Brammer, 2011; Mandel & Semyonov, 2006;
Mandel & Shalev, 2009; Misra & Moller, 2005; Nelson &
Levesque, 2007). In a comparative perspective, we expect coun-
tries with more gender equality-oriented welfare institutions to
have: (1) higher levels of childcare services, which release
women from their prevalent role in domestic responsibilities;
(2) a shorter difference in the lengths of paternity andmaternity
leave (meaning higher length of paternity leave and not higher
length of maternity leave); and (3) a higher level of parental
leave. Taken together, these conditions can reveal a more egali-
tarian perception of gender roles in welfare institutions.
Conversely, given the plurality of inputs underlying cultural
and labor institutions (e.g., labor regulation, earnings gap, ste-
reotypes, mental models, recursive practices, behaviors, etc.),
their gendered structure is suitable to be assessed in terms of
aggregate measure and final outcome. Consequently, we refer
to the broader concept of gender equality in society to measure
the presence of gender in national culture; meanwhile, we take
female employment and part-time female employment as a
valid proxy of how gender perspective is embedded within la-
bor markets. Since part-time jobs for taking on family responsi-
bilities may undermine women’s professional careers (Adams
& Kirchmaier, 2013), it is important to promote policies for
full-time female employment and family services. As a result,
we expect that countries with more un-gendered cultural and
labor institutions present high levels of gender equality in soci-
ety, high levels of female employment, but not high levels of fe-
male part-time work.
In terms of joint causation between the elected causal condi-
tions, we propose the following empirically testable
proposition:
Proposition 1b. High paternity leave, not high maternity leave,
high parental leave, high levels of childcare services, high female
employment, not high female part-time work AND high gender
equality in society are sufficient conditions to achieve a higher
number of women on boards.
The Role of Board Gender Quotas in National
Configurations
Configurational and set-theoretical methods are particularly
valuable to map countries as configurations of certain causal
conditions. This property allows for the theoretical and empir-
ical exploration of the necessary and sufficient function that
gender quotas on boards have in the existing national
configurations.
A condition is necessary if, whenever the outcome occurs, it
is present. It is sufficient if, whenever the condition occurs
across cases, the outcome is present. In other words, gender
quotas should be a necessary condition if, whenever countries
show a higher level of women on boards, they have been
enacted. Meanwhile, they should be a sufficient condition if,
whenever they occur, countries show a higher number of
women on boards. However, if theory-informed Proposition
1a is likely to be true, the joint presence of highly aligned
and consistent country-level causal conditions is sufficient to
achieve a higher presence of women on boards (Proposition
1b), without requiring any kind of regulation or self-
regulation at board level. In other words, their internal consis-
tency and gender neutrality entail superior effects on female
representation on boards, because of the institutional comple-
mentarities. Since the outcome occurs even in the absence of
quotas, in set-theoretic terms this means that gender quotas
are not a necessary condition to achieve a higher number of
women on boards. However, it is generally and logically true
that the presence of mandatory gender quotas at board level
implies the presence of more women in board positions. In
comparative perspective, this means that, whenever gender
quota regulation occurs, we expect countries to have a higher
number of women on boards. By definition of sufficiency, in
set-theoretic terms this leads to the assumption that gender
quotas are a sufficient condition by themselves to have a
higher number of women on boards and they represent an al-
ternative path to the outcome of interest. Indeed, several
scholars have acknowledged that in countries where particu-
lar women-friendly conditions are missing, affirmative action
may be a valuable alternative to have more women on boards
(e.g., Grosvold & Brammer, 2011). More formally, we propose
the following propositions:
Proposition 2a. Board gender quotas are not a necessary condi-
tion to achieve a higher number of women on boards.
Proposition 2b. Board gender quotas are a sufficient condition, by
themselves, to achieve a higher number of women on boards.
Definitively, if gender quotas on boards represent another
sufficient condition, Propositions 1b and 2b reasonably show
two equally effective and mutually non-exclusive pathways
to a major presence of women on boards. This circumstance
implies equifinality. A result is equifinal when different combi-
nations of causal conditions are linked by logical OR operators
(+). For instance, a resultant solution “A+B” implies that A or
B equally lead to the outcome.
RESEARCHMETHOD
Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis
Fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis (fs/QCA) has been
employed here to map countries in terms of their multiple
memberships in sets of institutional attributes. The aim was
to explore which causal conditions combine and complement
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each other to achieve the outcome under investigation. When
the assumptions of configurational theory are involved, this
method is more suitable to assess the presence of equifinality
and conjunctural causation, rather than statistical investiga-
tion (e.g., Fiss, 2007, 2011). Unlike statistical methodology
based on linear algebra, QCA relies on Boolean algebra and
applies a rigid logicmethodology to compare phenomena that
vary both qualitatively and quantitatively, for instance in na-
ture (e.g., present or absent) or degree (Ragin, 2002; Rihoux,
2006). Through comparisons across cases, QCA allows us to
uncover synergistic, combinatory and equifinal effects by log-
ically reducing the number of possible combinations of causal
conditions (Kogut & Ragin, 2006). For instance, Kogut and
Ragin (2006) note that QCA is able to identify eventual logical
contradictions: this property represents an important feature
to control, even though it does not avoid, the problem of omit-
ted variables, which can make spurious the inferred causality
(unobserved sources of variation, such as cultural disposi-
tion). Taken together, these advantages have made QCA very
widespread in political economy, management and organiza-
tion studies (Ragin & Rihoux, 2004; Rihoux, 2006; e.g., Fiss,
2011; Garcìa-Castro et al., 2013; Grandori & Furnari, 2008;
Kogut & Ragin, 2006).
Fs/QCA requires the transformation of conventional vari-
ables into sets “using theoretical and substantive criteria exter-
nal to the data and taking into account the researcher’s
conceptualization, definition, and labeling of the set in ques-
tion” (Ragin, 2008b:16). This process of calibration is particu-
larly significant as countries/cases have to be assessed with
regard to their membership in previously defined sets of
causal conditions (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). Instead of
a binary logic (“0” for absence and “1” for presence),
fs/QCA involves the application of fuzzy logic for more
fine-grained measures of the attributes under investigation
(Fiss, 2007). In particular, we make use of the “direct method”
of calibration, by specifying three threshold values: one for full
membership to the set, one for full non-membership to the set,
and one for the crossover point, or rather, the point of maxi-
mum ambiguity where cases have both a membership and
non-membership score of .5 in a given set (Ragin, 2000,
2008a). Furthermore, a fuzzy set (A) can be negated and it is
denoted by “~A” (Ragin, 2008b). The membership in the set
“~A” can be calculated as 1 minus the fuzzy membership in
the set “A”. For example, if we have a countrywith amember-
ship score in the set of “countries with high maternity leave”
of .6, the membership score in the negated set “countries with
not high maternity leave” is .4. Thus, denoting with k the
number of causal conditions, all their possible combinations
with their negations are 2k and they represent the rows of a
“truth table”.
Our analysis is computed with the current version of the
fs/QCA software package 2.5 (Ragin, Drass, & Davey, 2006).
By relying on the Quine-McCluskey algorithm, or method of
prime implicants, it permits a logical reduction of the detected
combinations. After calculating the number of cases with
greater than .5 membership score in each combination, the rel-
evant combinations of causal conditions are selected accord-
ing to their frequency. When the total number of cases is
relatively small, the frequency threshold should be 1 or 2
(Ragin, 2008b). We set as acceptable a frequency higher than
or equal to 1. Finally, the validity of the detected combinations
is assessed with the calculation of consistency (the measure at
which each combination can lead to the outcome) and cover-
age (the measure of how many cases with an outcome are
the results of a particular causal condition). They are calcu-
lated with the following:
Consistency X < Yð Þ ¼ ∑min X;Yð Þ=∑X
Coverage X < Yð Þ ¼ ∑min X;Yð Þ=∑Y
where X is the membership score of cases in a given configu-
ration of causal conditions and Y is the membership score of
cases in the outcome set. The minimum recommended thresh-
old to accept a solution as consistent is .75 (Ragin, 2006,
2008a).
Selection Criteria of Cases and Conditions
In line with Kogut and Ragin (2006), the selection of cases and
conditions was particularly consistent with our substantive
and theoretical interests and it required a systematic dialogue
between ideas and evidence.While the selection of causal con-
ditions underlies a reasoned synthesis of theoretical argu-
ments and empirical evidence previously discussed, the
choice of comparing the EU countries1 stems from two main
motivations. On the one hand, EU countries show different
performance in terms of female representation on boards, ac-
cording to their different economic, cultural, and regulatory
environments (Kang, Chen, & Gray, 2007). Given this hetero-
geneity, it is very challenging to explore whether a relative su-
periority of a particular institutional model exists. On the
other hand, the European Union is very committed in the de-
bate about gender diversity on boards, as it has asked publicly
listed companies to increase the female representation on
boards to 40 percent by 2020.While some countries have intro-
duced some form of regulation, others have opted for volun-
tary or recommendatory initiatives (Huse & Seierstad, 2014).
Furthermore, recognizing the disproportionate involvement
of women in part-time work and the persistence of the tradi-
tional caregiver model, the European Union has asked mem-
ber states to provide a major number of inexpensive and
high-quality childcare services, suitable forms of parental
leave for both men and women, and binding quotas for in-
creasing the presence of women in positions of responsibility.
These circumstances have created a common purpose on how
to have more women on boards, but they require further in-
vestigation. A key question would be whether regulatory pol-
icies enacted in some countriesmight be transferable to others,
and the role that institutional complementarities may have in
shaping female representation on boards.
In this study, countries are analyzed as configurations of
welfare, labor, and cultural institutions. We also include regu-
latory policies about board gender quotas to investigate their
role in the existing national configurations. With the aim of
electing the causal conditions to be included in the analysis,
the three main institutional domains have been detailed in
specific national attributes. While welfare institutions include
measures about maternity leave, paternity leave, parental
leave, and childcare services, labor institutions are expressed
in terms of the total amount of female labor force and the per-
centage of women involved in part-time work. National
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culture corresponds to the overall level of gender equality in
society and it can be measured using the Global Gender Gap
Index. Finally, regulatory policies refer to the form of regula-
tion for female participation on board (gender quotas or cor-
porate governance codes). Moreover, in order to express
these conditions quantitatively, we conducted a documentary
analysis of the main legal texts, statistics, and documents
which contain information about the phenomenon under in-
vestigation (Bailey, 1994; Payne & Payne, 2004; Scott, 1990).
They are mainly provided by the Council of Europe Family
Policy Database (2009); OECD Family Database (2012);
Margherita, O’Dorchai and Bosch (2009); EU-SILC (2012),
and World Economic Forum (2013). In this way, a systematic
review of legislation for each one of the 27 European Union
countries was made.
Tables A1 andA2 in the appendix show our datamatrix and
descriptive statistics. In the following section, we detail the de-
scription of both causal conditions and outcome and we dis-
cuss the criteria of their calibration in fuzzy sets.
Data Description and Set Calibration
Outcome Measures. A higher number of women on
boards is the outcome of our interest. Data about women on
boardswere taken from the European Commission’s database
on women and men in decision making (European Commis-
sion, 2012a, 2012bQ4 ), containing information on 582 companies,
corresponding to 5,910 board members. The companies cov-
ered are the largest (primarily blue-chip index members) pub-
licly listed2 companies in each of the 27 European member
states (maximum50 per country). As described in themethod-
ological section of the European Commission database
(European Commission, 2014), in countries with unitary
(one-tier) systems, the board of directors is counted as includ-
ing non-executive and executive members and data cover the
main board plus the members of the most senior executive
body (e.g., executive committee). In countries with two-tier
systems, data cover executive and non-executive members of
both boards but only the supervisory board is counted. Indi-
viduals sitting on more than one decision-making body are
counted only once and employee representatives are ex-
cluded. In order to express how many women there are on
boards compared with the total number of board members,
we use the percentage and not the absolute values. Moreover,
we take into account data from both executive and non-
executive board members, as we are interested in the attain-
ment of those positions held by women through their career
paths, rather than their performance in the boards of directors.
While to achieve perfect balance betweenmen andwomen re-
quires the presence of 50 percent women on the board, much
research has demonstrated that the critical mass of women di-
rectors is reached when boards of directors have at least 30
percent women. The President of the European Commission
invited publicly listed companies to voluntarily increase
women’s presence on corporate boards to 30 percent by 2015
and 40 percent by 2020, while, following the example of
Norway, the European Women’s Lobby recommended
Europeanmember states to adopt legislation requiring certain
companies to have 40 percent of women on their boards of di-
rectors by 2015 and 50 percent by 2020 (Armstrong & Walby,
2012). By applying these substantive guidelines as external
criteria to calibrate measures of sufficient or insufficient pres-
ence of women on boards in a country, we considered 30 per-
cent as the full membership threshold for sufficient gender
diversity on boards. Although this does not constitute ade-
quate proof of equality, it does represent a significant achieve-
ment. Thus, the three thresholds chosen to calibrate our
outcome are: 30 percent for full membership, 20 percent for
the crossover point of maximum ambiguity, and 10 percent
for the full non-membership. For these reasons,we specify this
target as the set of “EU countries with a higher number of
women on boards”.
Maternity Leave3. Since parental leave can be designed in
very different ways, we have adopted careful criteria to make
welfare institutions between EU countries more comparable.
In particular, only the statutory amount for maternity and pa-
ternity leave was considered. Moreover, thanks to fuzzy logic,
we are able to take into account the level of generosity of ma-
ternity and paternity leave by using a more fine-grained mea-
sure of these attributes, rather than their mere presence (1) or
absence (0). Finally, even though uptake of leave can differ
greatly from that allowed for by legislation, the laws provide
a condition that precedes the possibility of actually taking
leave. Thus, they mirror the gendered nature of welfare poli-
cies which potentially emphasize the prevailing role of
women in family responsibilities. The calibration was done
considering a crossover point of maximum ambiguity of
150days, approximately corresponding to the minimum
value of days recommended by the European Parliament.
The thresholds for full membership and full non-membership
were defined with an equal distance interval from the cross-
over point: 250days and 50days, respectively. The result is a
target set of “EU countries with high maternity leave”.
Q5Paternity Leave4. Amajority of members of the EU Parlia-
ment have approved a full paid paternity leave of at least two
weeks (Thomsen & Urth, 2010). For this reason, the paternity
leave set calibration was computed by considering the mini-
mum number of days recommended by the European Parlia-
ment as the full membership threshold, i.e. 15days.
Consequently, the crossover point and the full non-
membership threshold were defined with an equal distance
interval from the fullmembership value: 9days and 3days, re-
spectively. It will be the target set of “EU countries with high
paternity leave”.
Parental Leave5. In our analysis we considered only paid
parental leave as the sum of both mother and father quotas.
From Directive 2010/18 of the Council of Europe we know
that a minimum period of four months of parental leave for
each parent is recommended (European Union, 2010). There-
fore, in order to consider a countrywith a significant provision
of parental leave, we established a full membership threshold
of 240days, corresponding to about eight months if we con-
sider both parents. As above, the crossover point of maximum
ambiguity and the full non-membership threshold are
140days and 40days, respectively. We called this target the
set of “EU countries with high parental leave”.
Childcare Services6. This concept refers to the availability
of childcare services across EU countries. Data were taken
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from Eurostat, the statistical office of the European Union. For
our analysis, data relating to formal services with duration
higher than or equal to 30hours for children aged less than
3years (0–2 years) were chosen. According to the objectives
of the Barcelona Summit, member states aimed to remove ob-
stacles to female participation in the labor force and to meet
TABLE 2
Truth Table Analysis
Model: HighWOB
a
= f(HighPALp
b
, HighML
c
, HighPL
d
, HighFCHs
e
, HighFlf
f
, HighGE
g
, HighREG
h
, HighFpt
i
)
Rows: 19
Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey
--- COMPLEX SOLUTION ---
Frequency cutoff: 1
Consistency cutoff: 0.80
Raw
coverage
Unique
coverage
j
Consistency
HighPALp *~HighML * HighPL * HighFCHs * HighFlf * HighGE .49 .49 .85
Solution Coverage: .49
Solution Consistency: .85
Cases with greater than .5 membership in terms of the solution: Slovenia, Sweden,
Finland, Denmark, France
aHigh Number of Women on Boards
bHigh Parental Leave
cHigh Maternity Leave
dHigh Paternity Leave
eHigh Formal Childcare Services
fHigh Female Labor Force
gHigh Gender Equality
hHigh Regulation
iHigh Female Part-Time Employment
jUnique coverage is the rate of the sample that is covered by this specific pathway
FIGURE 1
Representation of the Solution
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the demand for more childcare services for at least 33 percent
of children less than 3years of age. This target represents our
threshold of full membership. Following the principle of range
equality, the crossover point was established at 20 percent, as
this percentage is neither too far nor too close to the Barcelona
objectives. In a similar vein, the full non-membership was de-
fined as 10 percent, as it does not get close tomeeting these ob-
jectives. This will be the target set of “EU countries with high
level of formal childcare services”.
Female Participation in the LaborMarket. Data on female
employment was taken from the Global Gender Gap Report
of the World Economic Forum (2013) and include a measure
of the proportion of a country’s working-age population
(15–64) that engages in the labor market. The agenda of
Europe 2020 proposes as a main goal the achievement of a
general employment rate for women and men of 75 percent
for the 20–64 years age group, as 75 percent is estimated to
be full employment where everybody who wants to get a
job should be able to do so. At the same time, the Lisbon Strat-
egy aimed to achieve by 2010 female employment of 60 per-
cent. In line with EU recommendations, we propose a
threshold of full membership at 65 percent of female employ-
ment. That represents a middle point between what had to be
done and what may be done in the coming years. Then, the
crossover point of maximum ambiguity and the full non-
membership threshold are 45 percent and 25 percent, respec-
tively, with equal intervals from the crossover point.We called
this target the set of “EU countries with high level of female la-
bor force”.
Female Involvement in Part-Time Jobs. Female part-time
employment rates were taken from the Global Gender Gap
Report of the World Economic Forum (2013) and represent
the percentage of women of the total female employment in
a country involved in part-time jobs. Since 1997 (Directive
81), the European Union has urged the removal of discrimina-
tion against part-time workers and the promotion of quality
part-time work (Q6 European Commission, 2010). Women are
the majority of part-time workers in the EU, with 32.1 percent
of womenworking part-time comparedwith only 9 percent of
men. This circumstance has a negative impact on female ca-
reer progression, training opportunities, and the gender pay
gap (Burri & Aune, 2013). Then, in order to consider a country
as having a significant female involvement in part-time work,
we argued that a value of 35 percent of the whole female labor
force indicates a strong imbalance between the way in which
women andmen stay in the labor market. Following the prin-
ciple of range equality, the crossover point was established at
20 percent, and the threshold for full non-membershipwas de-
fined as 5 percent. This will be the target set of “EU countries
with high level of female part-time work”.
Global Gender Gap Index. Data regarding the global gen-
der gap index were taken from the Global Gender Gap Report
of the World Economic Forum (2013). This index was devel-
oped to capture the magnitude of gender-based disparities.
In particular, it seeks to measure important aspects of gender
equality across four key areas, namely health, education, eco-
nomics, and politics, and it ranks a large set of countries in ac-
cordance with their scores in gender equality between 0 and 1.
For our aims, this index represents a suitable aggregate mea-
sure to assess the presence of gender equality in societies.
Firstly, it is independent from the countries’ levels of develop-
ment. For example, it is clear that rich countries can offer more
education and health opportunities to all members of their so-
cieties. Secondly, it is based on outcome rather than inputs.
This means that its focus is on the results achieved in outcome
indicators (e.g., the number of legislators, managers, or senior
officials), rather than in policy indicators (e.g., length ofmater-
nity leave). According to the logic with which the global gen-
der gap index has been constructed, we have calibrated cases
by establishing a threshold of .5 for the crossover point of
maximum ambiguity, 1 for full membership and 0 for full
non-membership. The result is a target set of “EU countries
with high level of gender equality”.
Forms of Regulation. Data regarding the legal or volun-
tary regulation of female representation on boards were taken
from several sources, such as the European Commission’s da-
tabase (2012a), the European CommissionNational Factsheets
(European Commission, 2013), Catalyst Report (2014),
Terjesen et al. (2014). By recognizing that the forms of regula-
tion differ greatly between EU countries, wemade a particular
distinction between countries with gender board quotas and
countries with forms of self-regulation (such as codes of good
governance). In this way, we assigned the value of 1 to EU
countries where gender quotas occur; .5 to EU countries with
some forms of self-regulation; and 0 to countries that do not
adopt any of the foregoing. However, if a threshold of the
crossover point is established at .5, for example, the calibration
becomes problematic, as several countries present this value
and their membership score in the fuzzy set would be .5. In
this way, cases can be conceptually ambiguous, because they
are neither in nor out of the target set (Ragin, 2008b). For this
reason, we established that .55 could be the crossover point
of maximum ambiguity. Following the principle of range
equality, the thresholds for full membership and full non-
membership were defined with an equal distance interval
from the crossover point. In particular, the former corresponds
to a level of regulation more than or equal to 90 percent (.9),
the latter corresponds to less than or equal to 20 percent (.2),
because it does not satisfy in any way the aim of gender bal-
ance on boards. This target set corresponds to the set of “EU
countrieswith a high form of regulation for female representa-
tion on boards”.
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
The truth table resulting from calibrations is shown in
Table A3. The analysis was made at two levels. Firstly, we in-
dividually analyzed the sufficiency and necessity of each
causal condition of a higher number of women on boards. Af-
terwards, we proceeded to examine their combined suffi-
ciency in order to explore joint causation and equifinality.
By definition, a necessary condition represents a superset of
the outcome set, in away that no case could show the outcome
without the condition. Hence, the fuzzymembership scores in
the causal conditions must be greater than or equal to fuzzy
membership in the outcome (Ragin, 2008b). The consistency
of necessary conditions is the result of the following:
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Consistency Y < Xð Þ ¼ ∑min X;Yð Þ
∑Y
To reduce the likelihood of true logical contradictions, the
consistency threshold for considering a condition as necessary
needs to be .90 or higher (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). As
shown in Table A4, the conditions that pass this threshold
are: (1) high level of labor force (1.00); (2) high level of gender
equality (.98); and (3) high level of maternity leave (.92). How-
ever, the different size of sets requires an evaluation of the cor-
responding values of coverage in order to check for relevance
and triviality. The formula of coverage of necessary conditions
is useful to establish whether the outcome set is much smaller
than the condition set. It is:
Coverage Y < Xð Þ ¼ ∑min X;Yð Þ
∑X
Figures A1-A3 report the graphical representations of the
distributions of countries in each necessary condition. Since
the greater the value of coverage, the greater the relevance of
necessary conditions, we should consider “not high maternity
leave” as a necessary condition to achieve a higher number of
women on boards, because it is fully consistent and has a
greater value of coverage than the others (.39). Nevertheless,
there is another form of triviality that should be avoided, i.e.
when the necessary condition might be a constant, because it
occurs in most of the cases under investigation (Schneider &
Wagemann, 2012). To check relevance without triviality, we
made use of the formula proposed by Schneider and
Wagemann (2012):
Relevance of Necessity ¼ ∑ 1 xð Þ
∑ 1min x; yð Þð
According to Schneider and Wagemann, if a necessary con-
dition is a constant, the resulting values of relevance are close
to 0 and they indicate triviality; conversely, they are close to 1.
Table A4 shows that for each condition that passes the thresh-
old of consistency, we obtained very low values of relevance.
Definitively, these conditions cannot be considered relevant,
due to their constancy.
Furthermore, we tested the individual sufficiency of each
causal condition employed in our analysis. Interestingly, we
found that none of them can be considered a sufficient condi-
tion leading by itself to a higher number of women on boards.
Indeed, their consistency values are not considerably accept-
able for establishing individual sufficiency. In line with the
criteria of calibration, the condition “high level of regulation”
refers to the presence of gender quotas at board level. Its con-
sistency value is around .50, showing that gender quotas are
not a sufficient condition by themselves to achieve a higher
number of women on boards. The corresponding results are
shown in Table A4.
The existence of necessary but non-sufficient conditions
(individually) implies a conjunctural causation because they
could be sufficient if combined with others (Schneider &
Wagemann, 2012). In order to explore conjunctural causation,
we performed the joint analysis of sufficient conditions and
the logical minimization of the truth table. After calculating
all the possible combinations (28), the number of cases for each
configuration was determined by selecting a frequency
threshold of 1.0. The outcomewas found by setting “countries
with a higher number of women on boards” to 1 for each con-
figuration (row) whose consistency level meets and/or ex-
ceeds the threshold of .75, as shown in Table T11.
Since there were not logical reminders (logically possible
configurations which were not empirically observed across
cases), in Table T22 we report the results corresponding to
the complex solution, or rather, that solution which limits
the analysis to the observed cases without counterfactuals.
For this reason, the complex solution is also defined as a
conservative solution (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). Con-
versely, when certain types of assumptions are made about
logical reminders, the analysis produces even the parsimoni-
ous and intermediate solutions, as broadly described else-
where (e.g., Ragin, 2008a, 2008b, 2009 Q7; Schneider &
Wagemann, 2012),
Our complex solution provides a single configuration of suf-
ficient country-level conditions leading to a higher number of
women on boards. This pathway displays a consistency
higher than the threshold of .85, which coincides with the
overall solution consistency, while the coverage shows a value
of .49, which is very acceptable. More in depth, this configura-
tion corresponds to the EU countries with high paternity
leave, not highmaternity leave, high parental leave, high level
of childcare services, high level of female labor force and high
level of gender equality. They are Slovenia, Denmark, Sweden,
Finland, and France, which have greater than .5 membership
in this configuration ).
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
To address the lack of a complementary-based approach in the
literature about gender diversity on boards, this study investi-
gates whether and how certain institutional domains in na-
tional environments are causally and jointly related to a
greater presence of women on boards and explores the nature
of their complementarities. Alongside, it seeks to empirically
assess the role of board gender quotas in the existing national
configurations to infer more about the reasons for their adop-
tion and diffusion. The core assumption in Proposition 1a
draws on institutional complementarities theory to argue that
the more “non-gendered” the welfare, labor, and cultural in-
stitutions, the higher the number of women on boards.
The empirical evidence provides support for a number of
our propositions. Particularly, Proposition 1b has been sup-
ported by the presence of countries with particular national
configurations where high paternity leave, not high maternity
leave, high parental leave, high level of childcare services,
high level of female labor force and high level of gender equal-
ity are sufficient conditions to achieve a higher number of
women on boards. Moreover, these results support that, taken
jointly, certain institutional arrangements inwelfare, labor and
cultural environments are causally related to female represen-
tation on boards of directors. However, we cannot infer the
same for the condition “not high level of female part-time em-
ployment”, since it is missing in the unique configuration.
This was probably due to its lack of consistency with the other
conditions, because there are countries, such as Denmark and
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France, where female part-time employment is higher than in
the others, even though their values are closer to the crossover
points than to the threshold of full-membership in the set of
“high level of female part-time employment”.
In line with our expectations in Proposition 2a, board gen-
der quotas are found not to be a necessary condition to
achieve a higher number of women on boards. In practical
terms, there are countries where the particular configuration
of national institutions is sufficient to foster the presence of
women in top corporate positions without enacting gender
quotas at board level (i.e., Slovenia, Denmark, and Sweden).
However, contrary to our assumption in Proposition 2b, we
find that board gender quotas are not a sufficient condition
to achieve a higher number of women on boards. Bearing in
mind the definition of sufficient conditions, this result is sup-
ported by the existence of countries which do not show a
higher number of women on boards, despite the enactment
of mandatory gender quotas (e.g., Belgium, Spain, and Italy).
As gender quotas are found not to be a sufficient condition by
themselves, our findings do not support the existence of
equifinal pathwayswhich can lead to greater female represen-
tation on boards. As a result, they cannot be considered as
equally effective andmutual substitutes of a “national model”
in which gender equality is radically embedded in each insti-
tutional domain.
In FigureF1 1 we graphically display our findings. As suffi-
ciency implies that conditions are subsets of the outcome,
the membership score of a country in the sets of the former
have to be equal to or smaller than its membership in the set
of the latter. This means that all cases should be above or on
the main diagonal. Interestingly, the XY plot shows some
qualitative differences between countries. By discussing these
differences, we propose comparative within-case studies to
corroborate our assumptions and assess the role of board gen-
der quotas within the existing national configurations.
According to the principles of post-QCA cases studies de-
scribed in Schneider and Wagemann (2012), “typical cases”
above the main diagonal are those which satisfy high value
of consistency and coverage in both the sufficient configura-
tion and the outcome (Finland, Sweden, and France), while
cases with good values in the sufficient solution, but not in
the outcome set, are labeled “deviant cases for consistency”
(Slovenia). Denmark represents a very difficult case: as it stays
below the main diagonal, Denmark contradicts the statement
of sufficiency despite itsmembership in both solution and out-
come. This circumstance substantiates what has been noted
elsewhere, exactly that Denmark represents a “deviant” case
among the Nordic countries (Teigen, 2012), due to its more
limited gender equality tradition in politics. In fact, the skepti-
cism about gender quotas on boards has led Denmark to opt
for soft regulation.
By focusing on typical cases, Finnish, French, and Swedish
national configurations show that the high gender neutrality
and consistency between their institutions are sufficient to
lead to more women on boards. In line with the results of
Grosvold and Brammer (2011), most of these typical cases
are primarily Nordic European culture-oriented countries,
where the embeddedness of gender equality in national cul-
ture is widely recognized. Conversely, we reveal that France
has a good performance in terms of female representation
on boards. While this finding diverges from the evidence
that generous welfare institutions in countries with French
and Germanic legal heritages lead to lower levels of women
on boards (Grosvold & Brammer, 2011), it is really consis-
tent with our assumptions. Indeed, France, Sweden, and
Finland share the highest provision of childcare services,
highest paternity and parental leaves, and highest level of
female employment between EU countries. Taken together,
this evidence highlights that assessing the influence of wel-
fare institutions on women on boards requires an additional
focus on their level of gender equality more than on their
mere generosity. The presence of more gender-neutral insti-
tutions, which are aligned and mutually reinforcing, en-
hances the presence of un-gendered structures in power
institutions and leads countries to better perform in terms
of gender diversity on boards. Under our rationale, it is
not surprising that Sweden, France, and Finland present
some of the highest rates of women on boards between
EU countries. Given the assumption of institutional comple-
mentarities underlying the theory-informed Proposition 1a,
it is reasonable to conclude that the less the gender perspec-
tive is embedded in these institutional domains, the higher
the presence of women on boards.
Although they were not necessary in this “ideal” configura-
tion, gender quotas for boards of directors have been enacted
in Finland and France. This circumstance suggests that in
these countries the implementation of gender quotas might
be due more to diffusion or legitimization reasons rather than
to rational sources. Kogut &Ragin (2006: 47) argue that “diffu-
sion depends upon existing configurations. This means that if
northern European countries share a thousand years of insti-
tutional and ideational diffusion, they aremore likely to adopt
institutions from each other than from other regions because
the institutional compliance is more likely.” Certainly, the in-
troduction of board-level gender quotas has become a socially
expected policy followingNorway’s initiative, and their diffu-
sion among EU countries seems to be not so much related to
rational and efficiency reasons. Even though gender quotas
are a near zero-cost policy for nations (Brogi, 2013), other costs
may arise for companies. In this vein, several scholars contend
that the introduction of board-level gender quotas can have
ambiguous effects on firm performance (e.g., Ahern &
Dittmar, 2012; Ferreira, 2014; Terjesen et al., 2014; Toomey,
2008), but isomorphic behaviors or reasons of social legiti-
macy tend to disguise these aspects. As shown in the recent
work of Seierstad, Warner-Søderholm, Torchia, and Huse
(2015), the EU represents a key influential actor in political de-
bates on potential regulations for female representation on
boards. The EU pressure has been particularly visible in the
case of Germany. Despite great skepticism and strong political
disagreement about gender quotas, Germany has recently
enacted quotas law: 30 percent of supervisory board positions
must be held by women from 2016. These insights underline
an important implication: if reasons of institutional isomor-
phism or social legitimization prevail, we can expect that
changes might occur in other particularly skeptical countries
(e.g., Denmark), as well as in countries like Finland or France,
where the institutional setting is already favorable to having
more women on boards.
Another relevant implication of our research is related to the
fact that the presence of institutional complementarities can
explain why introducing a new institution into a given system
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might fail to achieve the intended objective (Deeg, 2007). On
the one hand, our findings give evidence of what has been
noted in previous research (e.g., Adams & Kirchmaier, 2013;
Bergstø, 2013): if gender quotas contribute to reinforce
gendered or negative attitudes toward women, they cannot
be very effective and they need to be combined and
complemented with more gender-neutral family laws and
policies promotingwomen at all levels of their career advance-
ment, not just at board level. On the other hand, the high
complementarity between institutions in a “gendered” per-
spective might contribute to slow down the change, making
gender quotas not a sufficient condition by themselves to
achieve a greater presence of women on boards. This might
be the case for countries, such as Italy, Belgium, or Spain,
where gender quotas are not combined with a national envi-
ronment particularly devoted to gender equality. For instance,
Italy is not considered as a gender-egalitarian society and its
performance in terms of women in board positions is rather
disappointing (Seierstad et al., 2015).
Overall, this study makes several contributions. For
scholars, we refine and expand insights from the extant litera-
ture on gender diversity on corporate boards. We make a fur-
ther step in this stream of research by finding theoretical and
empirical support for the existence of complementarities be-
tween the main institutional domains affecting women on
boards. In this way, we open a window for future research
which might address a plurality of phenomena related to cor-
porate boards in a configurational and complementarities-
based approach (e.g., composition and demography of corpo-
rate boards, the effectiveness of corporate governance design,
or corporate governance practices). We also prepare the
ground for future investigations on institutional change for
women on boards. Indeed, “if institutional complementarities
exist, then change in one institution should precipitate change
in complementary institutions” (Deeg, 2007: 622). By taking a
configurational perspective, this study also makes an impor-
tant methodological contribution to the corporate governance
literature. Set-theoretic methods enable the empirical investi-
gation of the theoretically derived existence of conjunctural re-
lations between certain causal conditions. By employing
them, we provide an empirical demonstration of the joint in-
fluence of welfare, labor, and cultural institutions on the pres-
ence of women on boards. Moreover, fs/QCA allows for a
depth comparison between countries, particularly useful to
gain relevant insights about the mechanisms of the
diffusion/adoption of board gender regulation.
From a practical perspective, this research presents notable
implications for policymakers. Our insights may better drive
their choice about which mix of policies might be necessary
to improve female representation on boards, and especially
in which institutional domains they should be endorsed. If
the determinants of female representation on boards stem
from particular institutional arrangements, the aim should
be to achieve gender neutrality in each institutional domain.
Given the high interconnection between welfare, labor, and
cultural institutions and the mutually reinforcing effects of
their complementarities, it may be more effective to imple-
ment policies involving all these institutional domains, rather
than introducing regulatory policies just at board level. In ad-
dition, as quota laws may have ambiguous effects on boards
of directors and firm performance (see, e.g., Ahern & Dittmar,
2012; Ferreira, 2014; Terjesen et al., 2014; Toomey, 2008), more
rational-driven policies might consider the actual necessity
and sufficiency of gender quotas in the existing national
configurations.
However, this study suffers some limitations. First, even
though fs/QCA methodology allows for the exploration of
causal relationships, complementarities and synergistic ef-
fects, it relies mainly on the subjectivism of researcher
choices. To contain this limitation, we made our criteria in
the selection of cases, causal conditions, and calibration par-
ticularly transparent. Second, we focus mainly on institu-
tional environments without taking into account the
characteristics of national companies and corporate gover-
nance systems and practices. Our choice stems from the ev-
idence that legal and cultural environments play the most
role in shaping gender balance on boards rather than gover-
nance and business systems (Grosvold & Brammer, 2011).
However, as the national differences in types and systems
of corporate governance may have some effects, future re-
search could investigate the existence of complementarities
between firm-level and corporate board-level characteristics
in a comparative perspective and their joint influence on
women on boards. Third, our analysis included the differ-
ence between the implementation of gender quotas and soft
regulation, but the enforcement of the law varies greatly.
Clearly, when the enforcement is strong as in Norway or
France, then there is a direct relationship between the num-
ber of women on boards and quota. However, when the en-
forcement is weak – as in Spain – the consequences may be
feeble. Further in-depth case studies could overcome this
limitation by exploring the role of enforcement with regard
to the actual necessity and sufficiency of gender quotas on
boards. Finally, as our sample was limited in size, we did
not perform additional statistical tests. Future development
of this research could include European and non-European
countries. In doing so, it would be particularly interesting
to deepen our insights relating to the mechanisms of adop-
tion and diffusion of gender regulatory policies for boards
of directors.
To conclude, through this research we contribute to concep-
tualizing the problem of female underrepresentation on
boards as embedded within broader gender-related social is-
sues. According to our assumption, we propose women on
boards as the outcome of a set of complementary institutions
and re-frame them in terms of set relations. In line with
Amable (2000), acknowledging the effects of interacting insti-
tutions is very important for theoretical research and policy
recommendations. Thus, we reveal that the more the gender
perspective is embedded in several institutional domains,
the lower the presence of women in the overall power struc-
ture and, therefore, in top corporate positions. Therefore, leg-
islative initiatives should consider that the introduction of
gender quotas at board level might not be sufficient if gender
inequality persists in other institutions.
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NOTES
1. The EuropeanUnionwas established on 1November 1993with 12
member states. Their number has grown to the present 28 through
a series of enlargements. Since we compared EU countries from
January 2013 to June 2013, we had to exclude Croatia from the
analysis because its entry in the European Union has occurred
on July 2013. Thus, the number of cases we employed in our anal-
ysis is 27, but they constitute de facto a population rather than a
sample.
2. Publicly listedmeans that the shares of the company are traded on
the stock exchange. The largest companies are taken to be the
members (max .50) of the primary blue-chip index, which is an in-
dexmaintained by the stock exchange covering the largest compa-
nies by market capitalization and/or market trades (European
Commission’s Database, 2012a). More in depth: a) in cases where
the blue chip index covers a large number of companies, only the
50 largest are taken into account; b) in cases where the blue chip
index does not cover enough companies, companies with the next
largestmarket capitalization are taken into accountwhen possible;
c) non-national companies (i.e. those registered in another country
according to the ISIN code) are excluded so that the data for each
country cover only companies registered in that country (Euro-
pean Commission, 2014).
3. According to OECD’s definition, maternity leave is an
employment-protected absence for employed women in a period
around the time of childbirth. As the aim is to protect the health
of the mother and newborn child, this leave is generally taken
prior to (pre-birth leave) and immediately after childbirth (post-
birth leave). Most EU countries have compulsory pre-birth leave
and they provide public income support payments during this pe-
riod. In some countries, maternity leave is included in general pa-
rental leave schemes (e.g., Sweden, Germany).
4. Paternity leave is an employment-protected absence for employed
fathers. It is much shorter than maternity leave and it usually
starts soon after the birth of child. Because of the short period of
absence, workers on paternity leave often continue to receive full
wage payments. In some countries, paternity leave is part of the
parental leave schemes (father’s quotas), rather than established
as a separate right. In our analysis, we considered paternity leave
available to fathers only.
5. Parental leave provides paid or unpaid leave to parents for child
care. It is often supplementary to specific maternity and paternity
leave periods, and it usually follows the period ofmaternity leave.
6. Data were provided by the EU-SILC and the European statistics
on income and living conditions, the reference source for compar-
ative statistics on income distribution and social inclusion in the
European Union. Formal childcare services include four EU-
SILC survey variables, namely pre-school or equivalent education,
compulsory education, centre of childcare services outside school
hours, and day-care centre of child care, organized or controlled
by public or private sector. Formal childcare services are classified
by age group and duration as the percentage of the population of
each age group.
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TABLE A2
Descriptive Statistics
Criteria of calibration
Variable Mean
Std.
dev. Minimum Maximum
No.
cases Missing
Full
membership
Crossover
point
Full non-
membership
Women on Boards 14.68 6.75 3.5 28.6 27 0 30 20 10
Maternity Leave 128.48 32.93 98 227 27 0 250 150 50
Paternity Leave 10.48 17.15 0 90 27 0 15 9 3
Parental Leave 435.44 415.08 0 1095 27 0 240 140 40
Form of Regulation -- -- 0 1 27 0 0.90 0.55 0.20
Childcare Services 16.03 13.34 1 59 27 0 33 20 10
Female Part-time
Employment
20.85 13.27 3 61 27 0 35 20 5
Female Labor Force 64.74 7.62 43 77 27 0 65 45 25
Gender Equality .73 .04 .6707 .8453 27 0 1 0.5 0
TABLE A3
Results of Calibration and Fuzzy Sets
EU
countries
Set of EU
countries
with a
higher
number of
women on
boards
Set of EU
countries
with high
level of
maternity
leave
Set of EU
countries
with high
level of
paternity
leave
Set of EU
countries
with high
level of
parental
leave
Set of EU
countries
with high
level of
formal
childcare
services
Set of EU
countries
with high
level of
gender
equality
Set of EU
countries with
high level of
regulation for
female
representation
on board
Set of EU
countries
with high
level of
female part-
time
employment
Set of EU
countries
with high
level of
female
labor force
HighWOB HighML HighPL HighPALp HighFCHs HighGE HighREG HighFpt HighFlf
AT .08 .24 .01 1.00 .02 .81 .39 .93 .91
BE .11 .21 .05 .77 .83 .84 .98 .92 .81
BG .07 .91 .95 1.00 .03 .81 .01 .03 .83
CY .02 .33 .01 .01 .43 .74 .01 .20 .88
CZ .25 .80 .01 1.00 0.00 .74 .01 .07 .79
DE .35 .17 .01 1.00 .18 .84 .39 .97 .93
DK .56 .33 .92 .93 1.00 .86 .39 .73 .96
EE .03 .43 .62 1.00 .14 .77 .01 .17 .93
EL .03 .28 .03 .01 .18 .74 .01 .23 .72
ES .09 .24 .95 .01 .18 .80 .98 .60 .87
FI .93 .21 .99 .63 .61 .89 .98 .31 .94
FR .82 .24 .92 1.00 .67 .83 .98 .60 .87
HU .02 .63 .12 1.00 .01 .74 .01 .06 .70
IE .03 .72 .01 .01 .06 .85 .01 .98 .81
IT .06 .43 .02 1.00 .06 .77 .98 .90 .53
LT .34 .33 1.00 .95 .01 .79 .01 .12 .91
LU .04 .24 .03 1.00 .83 .80 .39 .88 .77
LV .92 .24 .62 1.00 .43 .83 .01 .14 .93
MT .01 .17 .02 .01 0 .74 .01 .77 .30
NL .61 .24 .03 .01 .02 .84 .39 1.00 .94
PL .08 .24 .92 1.00 .01 .77 .39 .17 .75
PT .02 .29 .62 .01 .96 .79 .39 .23 .92
(Continues)
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TABLE A3
(Continued)
EU
countries
Set of EU
countries
with a
higher
number of
women on
boards
Set of EU
countries
with high
level of
maternity
leave
Set of EU
countries
with high
level of
paternity
leave
Set of EU
countries
with high
level of
parental
leave
Set of EU
countries
with high
level of
formal
childcare
services
Set of EU
countries
with high
level of
gender
equality
Set of EU
countries with
high level of
regulation for
female
representation
on board
Set of EU
countries
with high
level of
female part-
time
employment
Set of EU
countries
with high
level of
female
labor force
HighWOB HighML HighPL HighPALp HighFCHs HighGE HighREG HighFpt HighFlf
RO .08 .33 .12 1.00 .01 .76 .01 .17 .67
SE .84 .17 .62 1.00 .97 .87 .39 .40 .96
SI .40 .21 1.00 .97 .98 .81 .01 .14 .88
SK .13 .17 .01 1.00 .01 .75 .01 .06 .79
UK .41 .72 .92 .01 .01 .81 .39 .98 .91
TABLE A4
Analysis and Relevance of Necessity Conditions
Analysis of sufficient
conditions
Outcome variable: HighWOB
Outcome variable: HighWOB
Description Conditions tested Consistency Coverage Relevance Consistency Raw coverage
High Maternity Leave HighML .50 .39 .39 .50
Not High Maternity Leave ~HighML .92 .39 .20 .39 .92
High Paternity Leave HighPL .72 .46 .46 .72
Not High Paternity Leave ~HighPL .41 .20 .19 .41
High Formal Childcare Services HighFCHs .57 .49 .49 .57
Not High Formal Childcare Services ~HighFCHs .57 .23 .23 .57
High Female Labor Force HighFlf 1.00 .33 .24 .33 1.00
Not High Female Labor Force ~HighFlf .26 .39 .39 .26
High Female Part Time Employment HighFpt .61 .35 .35 .61
Not High Female Part Time Employment ~HighFpt .64 .33 .33 .64
High Gender Equality HighGE .98 .33 .27 .33 .98
Not High Gender Equality ~HighGE .38 .51 .51 .38
High Regulation HighREG .58 .50 .50 .58
Not High Regulation ~HighREG .71 .28 .28 .70
High Parental Leave HighPALp .80 .32 .32 .80
Not High Parental leave ~HighPALp .25 .21 .21 .25
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FIGURE A1
Q14 XY PLOT – Distribution of Countries for Necessary Condi-
tion “High Level of Gender Equality”
FIGURE A2
XY PLOT – Distribution of Countries for Necessary Condi-
tion “Not High Maternity Leave”
FIGURE A3
XY PLOT – Distribution of Countries for Necessary Condi-
tion “High Female Labor Force”
FIGURE A4
Distribution of Countries in the Fuzzy Set for “High Level
of Maternity Leave”
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FIGURE A5
Distribution of Countries in the Fuzzy Set for “High Level
of Paternity Leave”
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FIGURE A6
Distribution of Countries in the Fuzzy Set for “High Level
of Parental Leave”
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FIGURE A7
Distribution of Countries in the Fuzzy Set for “High Level
of Formal Childcare Services”
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FIGURE A8
Distribution of Countries in the Fuzzy Set for “High Level
of Gender Equality”
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FIGURE A9
Distribution of Countries in the Fuzzy Set for “High Level
of Regulation”
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FIGURE A10
Distribution of Countries in the Fuzzy Set for “High Level
of Female Part Time Employment”
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FIGURE A11
Distribution of Countries in the Fuzzy Set for “High Level
of Female Labor Force”
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FIGURE A12
Distribution of Countries in the Fuzzy Set for “High Num-
ber of Women on Board”
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